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INTRODUCTION
Those who tout the role of disclosure as a benefit of the patent
system emphasize-as the Supreme Court has-that the information in
patents "add[s] to the general store of knowledge [and is] of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing
to pay the high price of ... exclusive use for its disclosure, which
disclosure ... will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of
further significant advances in the art."1
As I excavate in this Article, the current state of patent
disclosure-which many think is poor and does not achieve its objective
of stimulating innovation-is impoverished in part because it occurs so
early in the process of innovation, at the time a patent is filed. The law
mandates no further disclosures after this point. So much of the
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Co-Director, Engelberg Center on
Innovation Law & Policy. For their forward-looking comments, I thank Arnaud Ajdler, Jonas
Anderson, Clark Asay, Gaia Bernstein, Jeremy Bock, Dan Burk, Colleen Chien, Christopher
Cotropia, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Al Engelberg, Roger Ford, David Jones, Suzanne Michel, Craig Nard,
Sean O'Connor, Nicholson Price, Greg Reilly, Sean Seymore, Laura Sheridan, Stephen Yelderman,
and participants at the Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium on The Disclosure Function of the
Patent System and the 2016 Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium. I thank Doran
Satanove for excellent research assistance. I also gratefully acknowledge support from the Filomen
D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund.
1. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
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innovation process, from refinement to prototyping to market research
to mass production, has yet to occur at the moment of patent filing. Yet
the law does not require disclosure of so much of this valuable
information related to a patented invention. That is, patent disclosure
is early and static. In this Article, I propose requiring more dynamic
patent disclosure of important information generated post-patent filing.
In particular, I advocate that patentees should be required to divulge
all commercialized products they or their licensees make, linking the
products to the patents they reasonably think cover those products.
This form of dynamic patent disclosure would better effectuate patent
law's goal of promoting innovation by revealing helpful technological
information, communicating clearer notice of patent scope, and
generating useful empirical information to study the effectiveness of the
patent system in promoting innovation and commercialization.
Part I introduces the role and state of disclosure in the patent
system. Part II proposes that patent law implement at least some forms
of dynamic patent disclosure, underscoring the benefits of doing so. Part
III addresses and seeks to resolve some of the complications of
implementing a form of dynamic patent disclosure, namely, costs,
reliability, and spillover effects.
I. STATIC PATENT DISCLOSURE
At its core, American patent law exists to stimulate scientific
and technological innovation. 2 The law seeks to effectuate this goal by
granting the reward of time-limited exclusive rights in certain worthy
inventions to their creators as an incentive to create in the first place. 3
In addition, as the courts have long noted, American patent law seeks
to stimulate innovation by requiring patentees to disclose certain
information about their inventions. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
explained,
[Tihe quid pro quo [for the patent grant] is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient
detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the
monopoly has expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn
the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted. 4
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power "[tio promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
3. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1750-52 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004).
4. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (emphasis
added).
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In furtherance of disclosure, American patent law contains four
statutory disclosure requirements. The first structures the content a
patentee must present. A patent application must contain a
specification describing the invention in writing and concluding with
one or more claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the inventor ... regards as the invention."5
The other three statutory requirements-written description,
enablement, and best mode 6-are best understood as obliging-
disclosure of certain content within the specification. The written-
description requirement asks the applicant to divulge enough
information to indicate that the inventor is in possession of the claimed
invention. 7 To enable the invention, the patent applicant must
demonstrate in the specification to "any person skilled in the [relevant]
art [how] ... to make and use the [invention]," without "undue
experimentation." 9 Also, the patent applicant must set out "the best
mode contemplated by the inventor ... of carrying out his invention."10
As I have explained in previous work on patent disclosure,
should disclosure work, it can stimulate further innovation in multiple
ways:
First, it permits society at large to apply the information by freely making or using the
patented invention after the expiration of the patent. Second, the disclosure can stimulate
others to design around the invention or conceive of new inventions-either by improving
upon the invention or by being inspired by it-even during the patent term. Otherwise,
the patent system would not require disclosure earlier than the expiration of the patent
term, as it does here by requiring disclosure at the time of the patent grant, at the latest,
and typically much sooner.
... As long as there has been innovation, technologists have built upon extant
research, whether reinventing-and thereby reimagining-the cart wheel, the bicycle
wheel, or the roulette wheel. Disclosure of an invention sets out what others have already
accomplished, thereby both revealing information about those discoveries-enabling the
avoidance of wasteful duplication of the original inventor's research-and noting, usually
implicitly by omission, what has yet to be done. Patent disclosures act, as one
commentator labels it, as an "invisible college of technology." Use of these disclosures, in
turn, speeds the rate of innovation in society, which is central to economic growth.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)-(b) (2012); see also id. § 113 (indicating that applicants can include
one or more drawings, if necessary, to elucidate the invention).
6. Id. § 112(a).
7. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Gentry
Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
9. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 112).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Since 2011, when the relevant portions of the America Invents Act
went into effect, a failure to disclose the best mode is no longer a basis to invalidate an otherwise
valid patent. See id. § 282(b)(3)(A). Failure to satisfy the other statutory disclosure requirements
is a basis for patent invalidity. See id.
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... [Disclosure can further lead to the] democratization of innovation: effective
disclosure in a patent system should tend to equalize the positions of the initial innovator
and potential competitors by granting the latter the information needed to innovate
subsequently in the field. Without successful disclosure, the same inventor will be more
likely to continue building up on his original invention because he will be the one with the
best information to do so. In fact, inventors appear to innovate based only on the
information they already have when other information is difficult to acquire. Ineffective
disclosure, by extension, can also prolong the patent right beyond its stated expiration
because more of the useful information about an invention remains only in the patentee's
hands. Innovative rivalry, despite creating some inefficiencies, is more beneficial to
society-both economically speaking and as a matter of distributive justice--than a
prospecting system that fully concentrates the investment in a technological area in the
hands of the initial innovator. History has shown that most technological change comes
through the small contributions of ordinary, anonymous workers and tinkerers. That is,
more minds are able to effect that much more technological progress-both in
quantitative terms and in terms of the breadth of creativity-which benefits both society
and a broader set of innovators, including newcomers and those in the developing world.1 1
These helpful consequences notwithstanding, legal scholars
debate whether the statutory disclosure requirements stimulate
innovation. Some think that scientists and engineers do in fact turn to
patent disclosures to learn helpful technological information. 12 Other
scholars-including myself-conclude that the current requirements do
not sufficiently effectuate disclosure's goals on the grounds that
scientists and engineers do not look frequently enough to patents to
acquire technical knowledge. In large part, this is due to multiple
substantive aspects of patent law, including that patent law does not
demand enough or the right sort of disclosures from patentees, and to
patent disclosures not providing information that the public does not
already have. 13 Some nonetheless think that, even in this damaged
state, patent disclosures beneficially encourage technical disclosures
outside of the patent or can pinpoint for third parties the patentees from
11. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548-51 (2009) (internal marks
omitted) (citing Carolyn C. Cooper, Nineteenth-Century American Patent Management as an
Invisible College of Technology, in LEARNING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 40, 40 (Russ Thompson
ed., 1993)). But see Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 402-03 (2010) (proposing that disclosure should be seen as a goal that
can conflict with the underlying incentives to invent and commercialize and should be
subordinated to those more important goals).
12. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 562, 567-70 (2012) (citing, inter alia, Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents
and the Incentives To Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349 (2002)).
13. See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 940-45 (2011);
Fromer, supra note 11; Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131-
45 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745-49 (2012);
Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 657-669 (2010);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 467, 485-88 (2008); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof),
118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005).
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whom to seek further technical information through licenses. 14 There
has been no shortage of proposals, including some of my own, about how
to invigorate patent disclosure at the time of filing and to remove legal
disincentives to read patents. 15
Regardless of one's position on the efficacy of patent disclosure,
this debate has centered on what ought to be disclosed at the time of
patent application and how to review that disclosure's adequacy.
Amidst this vibrant discussion, there seems to be implicit agreement on
the following fact: whatever disclosure the patent document provides
does not extend beyond the moment of patent application. 16 Put another
way, the only patent disclosure that is required is for information
known to the applicant at the time of patent filing.17
Yet patent filings-the concluding moment of patent
disclosure-tend to occur at the beginning of the process of innovation.
In the American (quasi-)first-to-file patent system (and even under the
previous first-to-invent system), patent filing can and does happen very
early in the timeline of innovation.18 Patenting is permissible once a
14. See Anderson, supra note 13; Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 16-37 (2012); cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1543, 1564-66 (2016) (linking the emphasis on disclosure theory in patent law to the removal of
physicalism from the law).
15. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 11, at 563-94 (suggesting that the technical and legal layers
in the patent document ought to be teased apart, that indexing of patents ought to be improved
and that patent applicants perhaps ought to disclose three-dimensional models of their
inventions); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1215-22 (2008) (asking for applicants to provide more definitional
information); Ouellette, supra note 12, at 590-95 (urging for peer review of patent disclosure
adequacy); Jason Rantanen, Patent Law's Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 378-
81 (2013) (arguing against bifurcating the technical and legal layers of the patent document);
Seymore, supra note 13 (granting patent examiners the authority to request working examples
when patent disclosure appears inadequate).
16. In theory, patent applicants can amend their disclosure after patent filing. They almost
never do so because they will almost certainly lose priority on their filing date, or their constructive
invention date, for adding new matter to the patent specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012)
("No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention."); Lockwood v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (disallowing a claim of priority to a
previous patent application because of a somewhat different patent disclosure); Janet Freilich, The
Uninformed Topography of Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 171 n.85 (2015) (explaining
that patent applicants rarely opt to amend the specification "to broaden the disclosure therein,"
because doing so would delay the patent application's priority date).
17. Cf. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("[P]ublic policy does not demand that the public receive a new best mode disclosure in . . .
continuing applications. Such a rule would subvert the patent system's goal of promoting the
useful arts through encouraging early disclosure.").
18. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
65, 68-70, 72-81, 93 (2009); Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent
Troll" Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 469 (2014); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010).
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new, useful, and nonobvious invention has been conceived and reduced
to practice. 19 Reduction to practice can be actual, in that "the claimed
invention work[s] for its intended purpose," or constructive, merely by
filing a patent application that satisfies the statutory disclosure
requirements. 20 Constructive reduction to practice means that patent
filing can occur well before an actual prototype-let alone a
commercialized product-has been made. Legal and marketplace
pressures encourage inventors to file for patents at this early juncture.
The patent system grants priority to the first to file for a patent on an
invention. 21 This rule encourages inventors to file patent applications
expeditiously to avoid being blocked from getting a patent by a
competing inventor.22 Moreover, patent law's statutory bar to filing a
patent more than one year after disclosure of one's invention (among
other things) 23 compels inventors to file relatively quickly lest they bar
themselves from obtaining a patent. In addition, there are marketplace
pressures to rush to patent, in that patent applications and granted
patents readily serve as signals to venture capitalists and other funders
that the inventions at issue are a worthy business investment. 24
Given that patenting tends to happen very early on, it is often
only much later that a patented invention makes its way to the
marketplace. As Ted Sichelman explains, "[M]any of the twentieth
century's greatest inventions, including the television, radio, radar, and
penicillin, were not commercialized until decades after they were
19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (novelty, utility, and nonobvious subject matter requirements);
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998) (indicating that an invention is "ready for
patenting" when there is "reduction to practice ... or... the inventor had prepared drawings or
other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the
art to practice the invention"); Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 742 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("Making the invention requires conception and reduction to practice.").
20. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
22. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents
Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 528-29 (2013) (highlighting how a first-to-file
system gives inventors a "need to 'rush' to the door of the patent office"). Even under the first-to-
invent system the United States long had until recently, there was heightened pressure in patent
law to move quickly to patent-for example, between competing claims to have been first to invent,
the first patent filer would get a presumption of first invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). In addition,
other pressures that continue to exist in the patent system, such as statutory bars, likely pushed
inventors to file promptly in the previous first-to-invent system. See infra text accompanying note
23.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
24. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002); Gideon Parchomovsky &
R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005). But see Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Information with Intellectual Property, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 35, 39 (2014)
(citing Riitta Katila et al., Swimming with Sharks: Technology Ventures, Defense Mechanisms and
Corporate Relationships, 53 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 295, 316 (2008)).
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invented."25 Even when the innovation timeline is more compressed, so
much happens between invention and commercialization: refinement of
and changes to an invention, prototype development, integration with
industrial design, development for cost constraints, market testing,
marketing, distribution, and further refinements over time in response
to customer feedback. 26 During this development process-which is
typically post-patent filing-so much new information is typically
generated, information which will not be contained within the patent
disclosure. This information about refinements, development,
commercialization, and markets is bound up with the invention.
The reasons outlined above as to how disclosure can helpfully
generate further innovation apply just as much to this information,
especially as this information helps complete the fragmented
informational picture contained in a patent.27 Numerous scholars have
recognized as much in other contexts. Pertinently, Michael Abramowicz
and John Duffy propose a new intellectual property right to encourage
the production of valuable information about products' consumer
demand and market feasibility.28 Peter Lee discusses the important
tacit knowledge that patentees can transfer over long-term
relationships with other interested parties. 29 Mark Lemley and Robin
Feldman express skepticism that patent holders are effectuating
sufficient license-enabled technology transfer to provide third parties
with otherwise unavailable information beyond what is contained in the
patent document. 30 And Ted Sichelman writes on the importance of
encouraging investment in the involved journey from utility patent to
commercialization. 31
This valuable post-invention information tends to be missing
from the patent disclosure.32 In this Article, I will not go so far as to
25. Sichelman, supra note 18, at 343 (citing Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 272 (1977)).
26. See id. at 347-54; accord Cotropia, supra note 18, at 101 ("After an inventor files early,
she gains more information about her invention.").
27. See supra text accompanying note 11.
28. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008).
29. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 (2012).
30. Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Patent Licensing, Technology Transfer, and
Innovation (Feb. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2738819 [https://perma.cc/SK94-FXFW].
31. Sichelman, supra note 18.
32. While it is important to recognize that there can be chains of patents that build on one
another, which in theory can lead to post-filing patent disclosures in follow-on patent applications,
these follow-on applications are frequently continuation or divisional applications, which provide
2016] 1721
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propose that patent law ought to require that patentees disclose all of
this information post-filing. There are some good reasons for such a
requirement (principally, the utility of the public having this
information) and some good reasons against it (such as the difficulty of
enforcing whether a patentee has complied with such a muscular
requirement and the costs of such disclosure on patentees). 33
Instead, I turn now to Part II, wherein I propose a more modest
version of post-filing--or dynamic-patent disclosure.
II. DISCLOSING PATENT COMMERCIALIZATIONS
In this Part, I propose a form of dynamic patent disclosure: that
patentees be required to divulge all inventions commercialized by the
patentee or a licensee of the patentee. After discussing this proposal, I
enumerate the three principal innovation-spurring benefits of this
dynamic patent disclosure: invigorated disclosure, improved notice of
patent scope, and improved information on the relationship between
patents and commercialization.
The proposal is straightforward. Whenever a patentee or a
licensee releases a new product or version of an existing product that
the patentee perceives, or should perceive, to be covered by one or more
of the patentee's patents, the patentee would have a legal obligation to
file information expeditiously with the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") on the existence of the commercialized product and its coverage
by the relevant patents. 34 The PTO would make this information
available to the public, linking it directly to the relevant patents.
There are many benefits to this form of post-filing disclosure of
patented commercializations. First and foremost, divulging this
information would share more useful innovation information,
underscoring the reasons for patent disclosure discussed in Part I. By
virtue of the disclosed product having been commercialized, of course,
some information about the product-including the product itself-is
no new patent disclosure in the specification. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a), 120-121 (2015); 37
C.F.R. § 1.53(c)-(d) (2015).
33. In addition, it is likely that some of this valuable information gets disclosed post-filing
outside of the patent document. See Colleen Chien, Rethinking Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1849, 1866-72 (2016); Rantanen, supra note 14, at 21-37.
34. This proposal would comprise subjective and objective impositions on patentees. The
obligation would arise whenever a patentee thinks a commercialized product is covered by a patent
or should think it is. Another way to see this obligation is that it arises whenever the patentee
could plausibly sue an unauthorized producer or seller of the product for patent infringement.
Additionally, this disclosure requirement also ought to apply to patented methods when use of a
commercially released product would carry out that method in full or substantially. The proposal
would need to refine, as well, which versions of preexisting products would be covered by
preexisting dynamic disclosure and which would require new disclosure.
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already publicly available. However, linking that information to a
product's associated patent or patents would be beneficial. Not everyone
is aware of particular commercializations, let alone their link to
particular patents. This dynamic disclosure would alert those who are,
or are likely to become, aware of a patent, but not of its associated
commercializations. Once this information is bundled together with the
static patent disclosure, it should help shed light on that earlier patent
disclosure itself by giving a concrete instantiation to understand the
contribution of the patented invention. 35 That is, a tangible example of
a patented invention is often absent from the prose and drawings in the
current patent disclosure. 36 Third parties can capitalize on the dynamic
disclosure by buying the disclosed products, using them, and perhaps
deconstructing them to learn how they work, better allowing them to
understand the patent's contribution. 37 This dynamic disclosure would
thus help improve the disclosure function of the patent system, all in
the name of stimulating further innovation.
Relatedly, this dynamic disclosure would give a better sense of
the scope of patent claims. As I explain in prior work on claiming
intellectual property, providing tangible examples of what is protected
intangibly, in the form of an intellectual property right, can be helpful.
These examples can provide more effective notice of the extent of the
right than do the patent's peripheral claims-typically listing
characteristics shared by all embodiments of the invention. 38 These
commercialized exemplars would provide a concrete way to better
understand and contextualize what the typically too-abstract patent
claim language39 is doing. This then would help provide better
35. Cf. Fromer, supra note 11, at 574-79 (advocating that disclosure be invigorated by
requiring patentees to contribute a computer simulation of their invention and describe the best
exemplar of their invention); Seymore, supra note 13, at 641 (justifying a working example
requirement in patent disclosure with the observation that "[i]t is axiomatic that the best way to
teach a technical subject is with real examples").
36. See supra Part I.
37. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 92 ("Experimentation is a primary path toward technological and
scientific progress. When patents restrict experimentation, the tension between incentives for
initial invention and the progress that comes from building upon the available store of knowledge
is palpable."); cf. Strandburg, supra note 13, at 478 (describing the phenomenon of user
innovation-"innovation motivated by an intention to use, rather than sell, an innovative
technology"-that stems from using and modifying products released by others, and the
implications for patent law).
38. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 761-67 (2009)
(challenging the traditional view that peripheral claims provide the public with better content
notice).
39. See Fromer, supra note 11, at 568 ("Because the patentee's legal goal is to maximize
patent protection, the specification-much like the claims-will often contain broad or ambiguous
phrasings to maximize the probability of extensive patent protection in the face of ever-changing
2016] 1723
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constructive notice of patent rights. Better notice is critical because it
'lets the public know what is outside the scope of a patent's claims that
it can use freely and what falls within claim scope, for which a license
from the patent holder is necessary. 40 This in turn would help third
parties avoid patent infringement, resulting in less litigation and
associated costs, which can direct yet more resources toward
innovation.
Both of these consequences of dynamic disclosure-invigorated
disclosure and clearer notice of claim scope-come from putting a
burden of disclosure on the patentee. As much as this burden comes at
some increased cost to patentees, it is likely not overwhelmingly
significant, as a patentee can readily assess which products it or a
licensee has commercialized and whether these products plausibly fall
within the scope of its patent claims.41 Right now, absent this dynamic
disclosure requirement, the burden of linking patents to a patentee's or
licensee's products falls, perhaps too heavily, on third parties. As
between patentees and third parties, patentees more readily possess or
can assess this information and therefore ought to bear the cost of this
disclosure for the public benefit.42
This understanding is consistent with American patent law's
recognition, in some contexts, of the valuable information that
patentees more readily possess than third parties about the
implementation of their patented inventions and the linkage of those
implementations to their patents. A prominent context in which patent
law imposes disclosure requirements on patentees, likely for this
reason, is with. regard to process patents. The Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988 extended infringement liability to the sale or
use within the United States (or importation into the United States) of
products made by a patented process. 43 Congress worried that it would
be too easy to sue recipients of a product made by a patented process,
especially because possession of it implies no knowledge about the
technological conditions, further confusing the technical expert eager to understand the
invention.").
40. See Fromer, supra note 38, at 761 ("Clear content notice to the public ... is valuable so
that the public can avoid improper use ....").
41. I consider the costs of implementing this form of dynamic patent disclosure in more detail
below in Section III.A.
42. Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that
the cost of searching in patent law should be placed on the party with the lower cost of that search,
be it a patentee seeking out producers or a producer looking for patentees).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2010). See generally David L. Hitchcock & Craig Allen Nard, The
Process Patents Amendments Act: The Labyrinth, 3 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
441 (1993) (describing the impetus for and the details of this complex legislation).
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process used to make the product.44 It therefore required notice of
infringement to be sent by patentees to parties likely to be unaware of
the manufacturing process before filing suit, as a prerequisite to
obtaining infringement remedies. 45
Moreover, this understanding of dynamic disclosure's benefits
and who ought to bear its burden is similar to the reasons for patent
marking. As per statute, patent law encourages patentees to mark their
patented products with the associated patent numbers, either on the
products themselves or virtually by marking the product with a website
on which these patent numbers are provided. 46 The law encourages
patentees to comply with patent marking as a prerequisite to recovering
infringement damages, by characterizing it as a way to provide third
parties with notice-constructively-of patent infringement.47 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit understands the marking
provision to "serve[] three related purposes: (1) helping to avoid
innocent infringement, (2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the
public that the article is patented, and (3) aiding the public to identify
whether an article is patented."48 As such, patent marking provides to
third parties information linking patents and their commercialized
instantiations, but only if they already know of the marked
commercialized products, not if they start with mere knowledge of a
patent.49 For all of the reasons discussed heretofore, the law ought to
provide this linkage, whether a third party starts with knowledge of a
commercialized product or of a patent, by providing both an index and
reverse index of patents linked with their commercializations. 50 That is,
44. See Hitchcock & Nard, supra note 43, at 468 ("These notice provisions reflect the
sensitivity of Congress to the plight of innocent purchasers of goods under the Act.").
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(b); Hitchcock & Nard, supra note 43, at 468.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
47. See id. (stating that absent marking, patentees can provide actual notice of patent
infringement to particular third parties in order to recover infringement damages if they had
products to mark but did not do so).
48. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal
citations omitted); accord U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON VIRTUAL MARKING 4-5
(2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia-implementationlVMreport.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M9H8-PLGA]; Michael J. McKeon, The Patent Marking and Notice Statute: A Question of "Fact"
or "Act'?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 434-35 (1996); Preston Moore & Jackie Nakamura, The United
States Patent Marking and Notice Statute, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 85, 87 (1994); Jessica S. Siegel,
Comment, The Patent Marking & Notice Statute: Invitation To Infringe or Protection for the
Unwary?, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 586-87 (1999).
49. See Fromer, supra note 38, at 778-79, 779 n.317; Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive
Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1793 n.282 (2012); accord U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 48, at 17-18.
50. Cf. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 289, 307 (2012) (observing that the information-technology industry generally ignores
patents because "firms have no cost-effective way of obtaining a complete list of relevant patents
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whereas patent law already encourages the marking of products with
patents, it ought to also require the marking of patents with products. 51
Like dynamic patent disclosure, virtual marking-which
recently debuted in the America Invents Act of 201152-suggests an
appreciation for the ever-changing state of innovation information. As
Corey McCaffrey observes as a justification for virtual marking:
The rationale for virtual marking is that patenting an invention and manufacturing a
product are distinct processes. Patents are dynamic: new patents are granted, existing
patents expire, and a patent's scope may change during its lifetime. Manufacturing, on
the other hand, is typically static: manufacturing equipment is expensive to change, and
individual products are not modified after production. Traditional patent marking
entangles these different processes by requiring patent numbers to be labeled on physical
products.
5 3
Virtual marking solves this disconnect by allowing patentees to place
their ever-changing roster of enforceable patents linked to particular
products on a website, whose content can be modified easily, without
having to (expensively) change the manufacture of those products,
marked as they are already with the unchanging website address.54
The dynamic patent disclosure proposed here is also similar to
the disclosure offered in the Orange Book's compilation of patents on
drugs approved by the FDA for safety and effectiveness. 5 5 The Orange
Book contains a list of small-molecule drug products that have been
approved by the FDA post-1938 for both safety and effectiveness. 56 For
in the first place"); Corey McCaffrey, Note, The Virtues of Virtual Marking in Patent Reform, 105
Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 384-400 (2011) (proposing a public virtual marking registry to collect all patent
markings on a single website in a standardized format). There are recognized worries of false
marking, which patent law tries to discourage. I discuss false marking and the analogues for
dynamic patent disclosure below in Section III.B.
51. One easy way to implement both forms of marking would be to require all virtual, or
perhaps even physical, markers to submit that information to the PTO so they collect that
information there (and possibly also to require all virtual markers to use a standard metatag so
that all of the virtual markings online can easily be collected).
52. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 48, at 1-2.
53. McCaffrey, supra note 50, at 375.
54. See id. at 376; accord U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 48, at 16-17.
Nonetheless, there are some pertinent deficiencies to virtual marking, as implemented. The PTO
has analyzed several virtual marking webpages and found that all webpages listed all patented
products produced or sold by the company responsible for the webpage, with no single webpage
indicating a specific model or product type with which a patent was associated. See U.S. PATENT
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 48, at 21. This situation suggests that patentees can undercut
virtual marking's purpose to provide constructive notice about their specific products, by burying
the specific information for which the public might be looking in a sea of patent numbers. See id.
at 23.
55. The "Orange Book" is the colloquial name for the FDA's publication, Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (36th ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5J6-62VK].
56. See id. at iv.
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each listed drug is the list of patents that cover that drug.57 Although
the Orange Book serves as a reference for healthcare providers and
pharmacies to ascertain safety and effectiveness data for branded drugs
and their generic equivalents, it is thereby also a source of pertinent
patent information for pharmaceutical companies. 58  Generic
pharmaceutical companies, in particular, review the Orange Book to
identify drugs eligible for generic production, to determine whether
their generic version of the drug will infringe any listed patents, and to
acquire necessary patent information for their applications that they
submit to the FDA for approval of generic drug products. 59
Generic manufacturers can search the Orange Book for patents
and see their associated commercialized drugs. The Orange Book thus
gives generic manufacturers a better understanding of patent
disclosures and patent scope by linking them to their associated
commercialized drugs. Even though rarely discussed as such, thiis
consequence is baked into the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984, which sought to make low-cost generic drugs more readily
available by making it easier for drugs bioequivalent to branded drugs
to be approved to enter the market.60 The listing of all patents relevant
to the pioneer drug in the Orange Book expedites the FDA application
process by allowing the generic drug company to find the necessary
patent information for effective approval of its application to the FDA.61
Specifically, the Orange Book enables generic drug manufacturers to
facilitate expedited FDA application by linking patents to their
commercialized drugs. 62
57. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (2014). There are three types of patents that cover a drug: patents
that claim the drug substance (the active ingredient), patents that claim the drug product (the
active ingredient in combination with inactive ingredients), and patents that claim methods of use.
See id. § 314.53(b)(1). Absent from the addendum are patents that claim off-label methods of use,
drug packaging, processing, metabolites, or intermediates of the listed drugs. See id.
58. Jane F. Djung, Note, Insufficient Mechanisms for Orange Book Corrections and the FDA's
Ministerial Role: A Need for Reform, 47 CONN. L. REV. 229, 241 (2014) (explaining that the Orange
Book serves as a "source of use codes and patent term information").
59. See id. at 242.
60. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984) ("The purpose of the bill is to make available
more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs
first approved after 1962."). In furtherance of this goal, the Act allows generic manufacturers to
gain approval of their drugs by submitting an abbreviated application to the FDA. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j) (2012).
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(i)-(iv).
62. As Benjamin Liu elaborates, a registry like the Orange Book is the foundation of an
effective patent linkage system and serves three important goals: it provides notice to generic drug
companies to invent around or otherwise challenge a known patent and can therefore promote
earlier dispute resolution and avoid unnecessary patent litigation; it can benefit innovators by
creating an automatic barrier to generic manufacturers' entry for a set period of time and improve
transparency between companies; and it is cost-effective for drug regulators because it shifts the
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In fact, Mark Lemley suggests that the pharmaceutical industry
does not ignore patents like other industries do because the Orange
Book addendum makes them easy to find, especially because
pharmaceutical patent holders "identify all the patents they have
covering a drug."63 Or, as Timothy Holbrook observes, patents are not
fully serving their public notice function in the context of
pharmaceuticals; if they were, the Orange Book would not be as good at
providing notice as it is.64 The Orange Book is so useful that biologics
manufacturers have fought, thus far successfully, to exclude patent
listings of covered biologics from the FDA's comparable Purple Book6 5
as a way to shield their trade secrets (while scholars favoring notice and
disclosure advocate otherwise).6 6 Because it would be fruitful for the
other industries in which patenting takes place to garner these patent
disclosure and notice benefits, there ought to be an Orange Book not
just for small-molecule drugs, but an Orange Book for everything. (Or
perhaps a Rainbow Book?) 67
responsibility to the patentee of determining whether a generic drug infringes the patentee's
patents, and also rewards generic companies that invent around patented drugs and expose weak
or inaccurate patents. See Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese Experience
with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 665-68 (2012).
63. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 29-30; accord Lorie
Graham & Stephen McJohn, Thirty-Two Short Stories About Intellectual Property, 3 HASTINGS
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2011). This is not to say that the Orange Book discloses all useful patent
information for small-molecule drugs. For one thing, the law does not require the divulging of
process patents related to these drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2016).
64. Holbrook, supra note 13, at 141-42.
65. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BACKGROUND INFORMATION: LISTS OF LICENSED BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS WITH REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY AND BIOSIMILARITY OR INTERCHANGEABILITY
EVALUATIONS (PURPLE BOOK), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicAppicatins/Bi
similars/ucm411424.htm (last visited June 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LXF7-QDV7] (listing
biological products, including any biosimilar and interchangeable biological products, licensed by
the FDA under the Public Health Service Act).
66. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2016) (advocating that manufacturing information for
large-molecule biologics be disclosed to counter what are otherwise heavily guarded trade secrets);
see also Candice Decaire; John McDonald, Cynthia Rothschild, Kathryn Wade & Alyson Wooten,
Negotiating a New Legal Landscape: The Advent of Follow-On Biologics, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1029,
1053-55, 1069-70 (2012); Charles Davis, Note, Take Two and Call Congress in the Morning: How
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act May Fail To Prevent Systemic Abuses in the
Follow-On Biologics Approval Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1279-92 (2013).
67. One other similarity is to the Bayh-Dole Act's requirement that contractors receiving
federal funds report their inventions to the funding agency within a reasonable time, and should
they elect to retain their rights in the invention, file for patent rights thereon, to which the agency
gets a license. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2012); see also John H. Raubitschek, Responsibilities Under the
Bayh-Dole Act, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 311, 313-14 (2005) (explaining the
requirements of contractors and grantees under the Bayh-Dole Act).
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Having considered improved disclosure and notice, two
important benefits of this dynamic form of patent disclosure, consider a
last important advantage. By establishing this system of dynamic
disclosure, we would be better able to study empirically the relationship
between patents and commercialization. As many scholars have noted,
there is a great need for reliable data to answer many fundamental
questions underpinning the patent system, to get at how the patent
system encourages innovation (if at all).68 The data in the proposed
dynamic patent disclosure would shed important light on a number of
important questions concerning patent law's effect on innovation and
how to structure patent law. First, the data would speak to which
classes of patents (or even individual patents) yield commercialized
products. We would then be better equipped to evaluate whether the
law ought to provide encouragement beyond utility patents . to
commercialize, at least in undercommercialized sectors,6 9 or conversely,
whether there are too many worthless patents issued.70 Second, the
data would shed light on how many patents are associated with any
particular commercialized product. Currently, there is some
uncertainty about how many patents cover particular products, like
smartphones. 71 Having a better sense of the relationship between
patents and commercialized products is important to understanding,
68. E.g., John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP Studies:
Growth, Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757, 1759 (2014) (expressing a hope of "ever
greater commitment to more systematic and sophisticated studies of intellectual property's
normative justifications, empirical context, and actual and potential practical performance").
Empirical scholarship uses different methodologies, including social-science experiments and
statistical studies of natural data, to start answering important questions about innovation policy.
See, e.g., David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act
and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 517-18 (2013) (predicting from a study of natural
data in the United States and Canada that recent changes to American patent law will negatively
affect individual inventors); Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer &
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws' Creativity
Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1946-72 (2014) (reporting four original experiments designed to
measure the effects of different thresholds, much like intellectual property laws', on creativity); C.
Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
L. STUD. 613, 613 (2011) (applying econometric techniques to study the effects of brand-name drug
sales on the likelihood of generic drug companies' patent challenges); Mark A. Lemley, Su Li &
Jennifer M. Urban, Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding Patent Cases?, 66
STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2014) (studying the statistical relationship between district court judges'
experience and patent case outcomes, and finding that more experienced judges are less likely to
rule for the patentee).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 31.
70. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 832 (2016) (arguing
that examiners are increasingly granting low-quality and invalid patents).
71. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, N. Cameron Russell, Maxim Price & Anand Mohan, Patents
and Small Participants in the Smartphone Industry, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 375, 382 tbl.2 & n.23
(2015) (estimating the number of patents relevant to smartphones).
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for example, whether there are patent thickets-"dense web[s] of
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its
way through in order to actually commercialize new technology," in the
words of Carl Shapiro72-that ought to affect substantive patent law73
and apportionment of patent infringement damages for a subcomponent
in a larger product. 74 Third, we might learn more systematically how
long it takes for commercialization to happen for patents or classes of
patents, better informing the details of the timeline of innovation in
ways that might affect, for example, patent duration. 75 Fourth, we
would learn the number of different manufacturers per patent, lending
insight into questions on exclusive and non-exclusive licensing.76
Finally, the data would give a more accurate sense than currently exists
on which patent holders are non-practicing entities or patent assertion
entities, to help analyze these entities' common characteristics and how
patent law ought to treat them.77 Furthermore, it would provide a way
to mark off these entities in a more precise way than is done currently,
as a way to target patent law reforms concerning them. 78 These are a
sampling of some of the important issues that this dynamic disclosure
can help elucidate. It is ever important to start collecting and collating
important data like the links between patents and commercialized
72. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2001).
73. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1614 (2003) (arguing that patents should be narrowed to avoid the overlap between existing
rights).
74. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense of
'Apportionment" in Patent Damages, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 255, 256 (2011) (explaining
how smaller damages may be calculated with reference to an apportioned value of a product
"attributable" to a patented technology rather than the overall value of the product).
75. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 371-72 (1994) (evaluating through data the likely effects of the new twenty-year
patent term law).
76. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Ex Ante March-In Rights: A Market Test
for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (explaining that it is difficult to
determine whether exclusive patents encourage commercialization); Robin Feldman & Mark A.
Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 174-75 (2015)
(arguing that commercialization under nonexclusive licenses undermines the logic of the Bayh-
Dole Act).
77. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (explaining that comparing universities to "patent trolls" helps
determine what distinguishes universities from trolls).
78. Cf., e.g., Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOy. U. CHI.
L.J. 179, 201 (2015) ("Arguably, merits-related reforms, such as the heightened pleading
requirements and loser pays fee shifting of the current patent reform proposals, are better situated
to address concerns with bottom feeder trolls. This is because these reforms more precisely target
weak claims, thus minimizing the spillover effects that reforms have on stronger claims.").
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products so patent law can be reconfigured, if necessary, to optimize
valuable innovation, rather than undercut it or encourage innovation
suboptimally.
With the proposal and benefits of dynamic disclosure discussed,
I now turn to some complications that must be addressed in
implementing a system of dynamic patent disclosure.
III. COMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I consider, in turn, three categories of
complications-costs, reliability, and spillover effects elsewhere in
patent law-that might arise from implementing a form of dynamic
patent disclosure that requires patentees to disclose the commercialized
products that they and their licensees release, linking them to the
patents they reasonably think cover them.
A. Costs
While Part II primarily considered the benefits of implementing
a form of dynamic patent disclosure, 79 it is also essential to analyze its
costs. In the previous Part, I note that if the burden of this disclosure is
not allocated to patentees, it is assigned by default instead to third
parties, which is relatively more costly.80 That ought to be justification
enough to allocate any increased cost of dynamic patent disclosure to
the patentee, as explained previously. Moreover, if the legal
requirement is structured well, dynamic patent disclosure as proposed
here is an issue that patentees, licensees, and third parties could
support. If it improves disclosure and (constructive and actual) notice,
third parties will favor it. Patentees and licensees already marking
their products should not be opposed to this change, because they have
already determined the information they would need to provide, so the
cost would be minimal to them. Other patentees, like those biologics
manufacturers seeking to prevent required disclosure, might object so
as to preserve more secrecy or out of a desire to surprise third parties
with infringement claims.81 A patentee not marking its products might
also complain about the costs of construing its patent claims to see
which of its and its licensees' products are covered by its patents.
79. But see supra text accompanying notes 41-43 (outlining why the burden of this dynamic
disclosure should fall on patentees rather than third parties).
80. See id.




One might reject these concerns of costs to the patentee-
particularly maintaining trade secrecy and surprise-as being
illegitimate ones to consider. However, the costs-particularly of
discerning claim coverage-can be significant. For instance, when a
patentee issues non-exclusive licenses to many others for multiple
patents, the patentee has to supervise, in some way, what the licensees
are doing.82 As another example, some products-like software8 3 or
smartphones 84-map onto a very large number of patents, so the
patentee will have much more work to do to discern which patents need
further dynamic disclosure, as compared with patentees whose
products map onto a small number of patents, as in the pharmaceutical
industry.85 As a last example, and perhaps most poignantly, in some
areas patent claim boundaries are clearer than in others, which might
make it disproportionately costly in some contexts to discern whether a
patentee's or licensee's product is in fact covered by a patent claim.8 6
If these costs are sufficiently large relative to the benefits of
dynamic disclosure, there are two possibilities for implementation
beyond assigning these costs to the patentee. First, the law might
require dynamic disclosure but offset its costs with benefits to the
patentee. One possibility would be more widespread constructive notice
of patent rights and infringement.87 A second, softer possibility is to
encourage rather than require dynamic patent disclosure with
incentives to the patentee. Just as patent marking is not technically
required, but patentees cannot easily recover damages otherwise before
actually notifying an infringer, so too might patentees be encouraged to
provide dynamic disclosure.
Incentives that confer constructive notice, or for that matter
enhanced damages, will help encourage patentees that sue, or might
plausibly sue, others to disclose commercialized products linked to their
82. In response, the law could place the burden of disclosure on the licensee, but it probably
rests more efficiently with the patentee as between the two parties.
83. E.g., Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2007) (explaining that the software industry involves many narrow
patents).
84. See supra text accompanying note 71.
85. E.g., Engey Elrefaie, Note, Injunctive Relief Post eBay and the Various Applications of
the Four-Factor Test in Differing Technological Industries, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 219, 239
(2010) (explaining that pharmaceutical patents often consist of one component).
86. Of course, in response, one might reiterate that patentees (and even licensees) are better
able to bear this cost than unrelated third parties. And if patentees cannot discern which of its
own patents cover its own or licensed products, then how would it be reasonable to expect third
parties to determine if their products are covered by these patents and make them liable for patent
infringement?




patents. What incentives might be offered to companies that seek
patents and commercialize products, yet do not typically assert their
patents against others?88 These companies might find incentive enough
in the offsetting benefits they would get from dynamic patent
disclosure. Specifically, third parties can and do assert their patents
against these companies. They thus need to manage their risk and be
vigilant as to which patents might potentially be asserted against them.
Systemic dynamic patent disclosure would give them a better sense of
those patents than they currently get by making it easier for them to
locate those that cover products in a similar product space to their own
products.
In sum, there are costs to dynamic patent disclosure that ought
to be considered. That said, they either are negligible, ought to be placed
on patentees, or can be offset by conferring benefits on patentees that
bear these costs.
B. Reliability
In addition to cost, dynamic patent disclosure needs to be
reliably accurate to confer its benefits. If there were no consequence for
doing so, some patentees might link commercialized products to a
subset of their patents that do not cover those products or fail to so link
when the patents do cover those products. They might do so to mislead
third parties that their patents reach more broadly than they do, while
seeming to comply with dynamic disclosure, or because they do not want
to bear the cost of actually investigating and narrowing down which of
their patents link up to which of their commercialized products. In
doing so, they can unfairly stifle competition or harm the path of
innovation, particularly by preventing others from marketing
unpatented products.8 9
Since 1842, patent law has been addressing an analogue of this
concern with regard to the false marking of products with patent
numbers, due to similar motivations by patentees.90 Currently, the
88. This situation tends to obtain in the high-technology sector. See generally Colleen V.
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications
for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) (arguing that high-technology companies
frequently get patents to guard against patent litigation by competitors).
89. Cf. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (asserting
similar negative consequences of false patent marking); Steve Williams & Jane Du, Successfully
Defending Against False Marking Claims, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 10, 11-12 (2010) (same).
90. E.g., Mark H. Anania & Carissa L. Rodrigue, Combating the Rise of False Marking Trolls,
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2011, at 3, 3 (describing plaintiffs who experience no harm but
bring false patent marking cases as "false marking trolls"); Kevin Zickterman, Comment, Pa-
'Trolling' the False Marking Frontier: Giving Section 292 the Proper Makeover in Wake of the
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statute provides that "[w]hoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in
advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word 'patent'
or any word or number importing that the same is patented, for the
purpose of deceiving the public" can be liable for false marking.9 1 Either
the U.S. government can sue to fine the violator for up to $500, or "[a]
person who has suffered a competitive injury as a result of a violation
of this section may file a civil action in a district court of the United
States for recovery of damages adequate to compensate for the injury. '92
These provisions are designed to deter false marking and the harms
they confer on society. To avoid similar problems with dynamic patent
disclosure, the law ought to install similar penalties for false disclosures
(with attention paid to deterring an over-assertion of "false disclosure"
claims to recover against operating companies, as has been an issue
with regard to false marking93).
C. Spillover Effects
Before implementing dynamic patent disclosure, it is important
to ensure that any negative spillover effects in other areas of patent law
are cabined or addressed, if they indeed exist.
The most pressing spillover is with regard to patent claim
construction.9 4 That is, how much should dynamic disclosures (let alone
other post-patent-filing information) influence our understanding of
patent claims? 95 On the one hand, it is nearly canonical blackletter law
that patent claims are given "the[ir] ordinary and customary meaning
America Invents Act, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 189, 192-94 (2012) (providing background on the history
of false marking claims).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2012).
92. Id. § 292(a)-(b).
93. See, e.g., Anania & Rodrigue, supra note 90; Zickterman, supra note 90, at 195-200, 218-
52 (emphasizing how the false marking provisions have been recently amended to add a
competitive injury requirement for a nongovernmental suit in response to a frenzy of false marking
claims).
94. Additionally, given that patents speak to many different types of groups, and are used in
different ways communicatively, it would be important to study ethnographically whether post-
filing disclosures could harm these other communicative uses. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences,
69 VAND. L. REV. 1603 (2016) (arguing that there are benefits to patent silence and nondisclosure).
95. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
101, 102 (2005):
In order to construe the claims of a patent, the court must fix the meaning of the claim
terms as of a particular point in time. Both the knowledge of the [person having
ordinary skill in the art] in a particular field and the meaning of particular terms to
that [person having ordinary skill in the art] will frequently change over time. Indeed,
the risk of change in the meaning of terms over time is particularly great in patent law,
because patents necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to
describe those new ideas is not static.
1734 [Vol. 69:6:1715
DYNAMIC PATENT DISCLOSURE
of a claim term[, which] is the meaning that the term would have to a
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application."
96
From that rule, it would seem that post-filing information should have
little to no role in claim construction.
If one of the key benefits of dynamic disclosure is that it will help
contextualize the otherwise hard-to-parse disclosure and provide better
notice of patent claim meaning, however, this dynamic disclosure would
seem to affect, or at least inform, claim meaning post-filing.
Nonetheless, that need not be the case; there is less tension between
dynamic disclosure and this tenet of claim construction than there
might seem. For good reason, patent claim construction doctrine also
states that claims should be construed to cover the preferred
embodiments that the patentee sets out in its applications 7 As the
Federal Circuit has explained, "A construction which reads the
preferred embodiment out of the scope of the claims would generally
seem at odds with the intention of the patentee as expressed in the
specification."98 On its face, this canon deals not with post-filing
disclosures, but with disclosure in the patent application itself.
Therefore, it is in no tension with the timing construction canon. It is,
however, instructive. The justification for the preferred-embodiment
canon seems to be that a patentee would obviously seek patent coverage
that includes the best way of practicing the invention. The patentee has
no general strategic incentive to disclose a preferred embodiment and
proceed to place it outside the corresponding claims' scope.
The same is likely true of post-filing product commercializations.
There is every chance that, barring a substantial lack of foresight,
patentees' commercialized products fall within the scope of their claim
construction. Otherwise, those products-because they lie outside
patent claim scope-could be copied freely by competitors. Moreover, if
a patentee, post-patent filing, comes to realize that a product it would
like to bring to market falls outside of its claim scope, it would probably
file one or more follow-up patent applications-whether through a
continuation application or a new standalone application-to cover that
product. In either case, the patentee would likely end up with one or
more patents that cover this commercialized product.
96. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
97. E.g., PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Comme'ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747,755 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (stating





This analysis helps dissolve the apparent tension between post-
filing information about commercialized products being used to inform
patent claims, whose meaning is to be fixed as of the patent filing date.
This post-filing information can be reliably used to interpret the
meaning of the claim terms as of the filing date because both forms of
information will tend to cohere strategically for the patentee. That is
why it can reliably be used by third parties to invigorate patent
disclosure and help provide them with notice of patent scope in the first
instance. 99
There remains one other important concern with regard to claim
construction: penalizing those patentees who have commercialized
their inventions, as compared with non-practicing entities or patent
assertion entities, which have not. If patent disclosure and claim scope
can be informed by disclosed commercialized products, then what of
entities that are not commercializing their patented inventions?
Perhaps patent assertion entities-which, if anything, ought to be
deprivileged for not commercializing their invention or at least for not
providing licensees with any valuable technical information 100 -would
then have the perverse ability to mold the meaning of their claim terms
to cover defendants' products in a way that operating companies cannot.
This concern is a serious one, given the critical focus on infringement
suits brought by patent assertion entities in recent years,101 even if
patent doctrine is otherwise being adjusted to curb these suits.102
That said, my proposal for dynamic patent disclosure can be
repurposed not only to prevent patent assertion entities from having
more opportunity to stretch claim meaning, but also to provide a
practicable way to penalize them in claim construction, should that be
desirable. Specifically, as noted above, my version of dynamic disclosure
99. See supra Part II.
100. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been
Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 571-74 (2015) (discussing parties holding intellectual property
rights that do not contribute to various forms of progress).
101. There are debates over how to interpret litigation data and whether there has indeed
been an explosion in recent years in lawsuits brought by patent assertion entities. Compare, e.g.,
Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 78 (2013) (arguing that there has been such an
increase), with, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 654-55 (2014) (making the case that there
has not been any rise in such litigation).
102. For example, non-practicing entities have had a harder time securing injunctive relief
when they win patent infringement litigation. Benjamin Petersen, Note, Injunctive Relief in the
Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 217 (2008) (arguing that eBay is limited to
nonpracticing patent holders). Others propose having litigation losers pay winners' fees as a way
to deter frivolous suits perceived to be brought disproportionately by patent assertion entities.
Reilly, supra note 78 (discussing this view).
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marks non-practicing entities and patent assertion entities as separate
from operating companies. 10 3 Separating these categories of companies
provides a way to treat them differently. At a minimum, courts can be
attentive in infringement suits brought by patent assertion entities to
disallow claim stretching. Another possibility is to operationalize John
Duffy's approach to revive the paper patent doctrine to favor patents
that have been commercialized and disfavor those that have not, on the
basis that "a practiced patent discloses more, teaches more, and
contributes more to the sum total of social knowledge than does a mere
paper patent."10 4
All in all, careful integration of dynamic patent disclosure into
patent law can be achieved with minimal negative spillover into other
areas of patent law.
CONCLUSION
If the patent system's disclosure function is to effectuate its goals
of stimulating innovation by sharing critical scientific and technological
information pertaining to patented inventions, it is critical to
appreciate that much of this information tends to be generated after
patents are filed. As such, this Article proposes that patent law take a
step in the direction of dynamic patent disclosure by requiring
patentees to divulge some of the most useful information related to their
patented inventions, namely, post-filing information on the products
they or their licensees commercialize. This information will invigorate
the goals that patent law's disclosure function is thought to serve, as
well as improve public notice of patent rights and enable better
empirical study of the role that patents play in stimulating innovation
and commercialization.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
104. John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1395
(2013).
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